Consideration of future consequences

Overview

Often, individuals need to decide which of several courses of action to pursue. They might, for example, need to decide whether they should watch TV or study. While reaching these decisions, some individuals are especially likely to consider the future, rather than immediate, consequences of their decisions. These individuals are willing to sacrifice their immediate needs to secure future benefits (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994). This inclination, called consideration of future consequences, reduces the likelihood of many undesirable behaviors, such as aggressive acts and increases the likelihood of many desirable behaviors, such as preference for public transport (for reviews, see Joireman, Strathman, & Balliet, 2006; Strathman & Joireman, 2005).

Correlates of consideration of future consequences

Aggression

Individuals who consider the future consequences of their actions and decisions are, frequently but not invariably, more aggressive than individuals who do not consider the future consequences of their actions and decisions (Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003). Similarly, as an experimental study demonstrated, consideration of future consequences tends to foster cooperation, rather than competition, between individuals and groups (Wolf, Cohen, Kirchner, Rea, Montoya, & Insko, 2009). Nevertheless, consideration of future consequences is positively related to aggression only in a subset of contexts.

For example, aggression towards a person that individuals will never meet again is not strongly related to consideration of future consequences. In contrast, aggression towards a person that individuals will regularly meet again is inversely, and appreciably, related to consideration of future consequences (Joireman, Anderson, & Strathman, 2003). That is, if individuals are likely to meet someone again, aggressive interactions now might undermine the benefits of this relationship in the future. Only individuals who consider the future consequences of their actions are especially sensitive to this possibility.

Moore and Dahlen (2008) showed that consideration of future consequences is inversely associated with aggressive driving and the expression anger. Again, when individuals consider future consequences, the degree to which they are governed by their immediate impulses may diminish.

Health behavior

Consideration of future consequences, in general, is positively related to health behaviors and inversely related to unhealthy acts, such as substance abuse. Piko, Luszczynska, Gibbons, and Tekozel (2005), for example, showed that consideration of future consequences, as a measure by a shortened version of the traditional scale, coupled with life satisfaction and academic achievement, were inversely associated with incidence of smoking. In addition, consideration of future consequences was associated with smoking behavior across a range of nations, including Hungary, Turkey, Poland, and America.

Consideration of future consequences can even affect the extent to which parents engage in health behaviors to protect their children. In a study conducted by Morison, Cozzolino, and Orbell (2010), parents received information about vaccines, intended to prevent infection with the human papillomavirus, the cause of cervical cancer. Both the benefits and concerns of this vaccine were delineated. Parents then transcribed some of their thoughts and completed a series of measures about the attitudes towards the vaccine and their consideration of future consequences. If parents considered future consequences, they generated more positive than negative thoughts about the vaccine--presumably because most of the drawbacks of this procedure relate to more immediate events. They were more inclined to organize this vaccine for their daughters in the future.

Environmental behavior

Consideration of future consequences is also positively associated with the inclination to conserve the environment (Joireman, Lasane, Bennett, Richards, & Solaimani, 2001). Individuals who report a consideration of future consequences, for example, prefer to utilize public transport; this association is especially pronounced in individuals who recognize the detrimental impact of private vehicles on natural environments (Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004; see also Joireman, Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2001).

Motivation and effort

Consideration of future consequences is also associated with persistence and effort (Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008). That is, if individuals consider the future, rather than immediate, consequences of their actions and decisions, they are more likely to persist with taxing or tedious activities. Specifically, individuals who do not endorse items that relate to the importance of immediate consequences--and thus are not as susceptible to temptations--demonstrate more self control.

Organizational citizenship behavior

Consideration of future consequences is positively related to organizational citizenship behavior, such as accepting unpleasant but necessary initiatives and assisting colleagues. Nevertheless, consideration of future consequences translates to these discretionary and helpful acts only when individuals feel committed to the organization (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006). Presumably, if individuals feel committed to the organization, they want the workplace to flourish in the future. This desire will prompt organizational citizenship behaviors, but only if they deliberate over the future consequences of their impending actions.

Fiscal responsibility

A variety of studies have shown that consideration of future consequences is associated with fiscal responsibility. Consideration of future consequences, for example, is positively related to the inclination of individuals to save money (Nyhus & Webley, 2001; Webley & Nyhus, 2006).

To some extent, this fiscal responsibility could reflect limited temporal discounting. That is, individuals usually assume that rewards or benefits now are more important than rewards or benefits in the future, called temporal discounting. Temporal discounting has indeed been shown to diminish in participants who consider future consequences (Joireman, Sprott, & Spangenberg, 2005).

Two forms of temporal discounting have been differentiated: exponential and hyperbolic (se Ainslie, 2001, 2006). According to exponential discounting, the value of some reward diminishes proportionately with time. If $100 today is equivalent to $200 in one week, then $100 today is also equivalent to $300 in two weeks. According to hyperbolic discounting, a similar function underpins the decline in value over time. However, initially, the value does not diminish as steeply over time as does exponential discounting. After some particular time, the value then begins to diminish more steeply. Hyperbolic discounting arises because individuals sometimes value future rewards more than anticipated. They might, for example, perceive future rewards as diagnostic of immediate decisions--hence, they perceive these future events as psychologically close in time.

Demographics

A few studies have examined which demographic variables are related to consideration of future consequences. Toepoel (2010), for example, showed that education is positively associated with consideration of future consequences. Petrocelli (2003) showed that consideration of future consequences was elevated in men, relative to women, but Toepoel (2010) did not replicate this finding.

Mechanisms that underpin consideration of future consequences

Overall, research into the processes that affect consideration of future consequences is limited. Nevertheless, a variety accounts have been proposed (e.g., see Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Edwards (1994) maintain that dramatic improvements in the socioeconomic status of individuals, as well as other events, might affect the extent to which individuals feel their decisions and behaviors now could affect the lives in the future. These changes, thus might foster a consideration of future consequences.

The educational opportunities of individuals can also affect the likelihood they will consider future consequences. Individuals who complete courses in decision making, for example, are more likely to consider future consequences (Bernheim, Garrett, & Maki, 2001). These courses might provoke reflection, which in turn can dissociate individuals from their immediate urges.

Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez (1992), in contrast, primarily ascribe consideration of future consequences to family environments in which delay of gratification is nurtured. That is, children who are reinforced when they defer a pleasurable activity, for example, might be more likely to develop the inclination to orient their attention to future consequences. This mechanism is analogous to the finding that future orientation of parents is associated with future orientation of children (Webley & Nyhus, 2006).

The CAPS model

Individuals often need to suppress or restrain their immediate temptations, impulses, urges, and emotions to earn future rewards. They might, for example, need to inhibit their motivation to sleep and study for an exam. They might need to inhibit their desire to eat a marshmallow now, even if told they can receive two marshmallows later if they delay their consumption, called the marshmallow test (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1992). This capacity is called delayed or deferred gratification and is highly correlated to consideration of future consequences (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994).

Several models have been proposed to explain the mechanisms that underpin delayed gratification; these models, thus, should be applicable to consideration of future consequences as well. One theory was proposed by Mischel and Ayduk (2002), and derived from the cognitive-affective personality systems (CAPS) model (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). The CAPS model, as delineated by Mischel and Shoda (1995), conceptualizes personality as a network of units that represent potential cognitive or affective responses, each activated by cues in the environment. These units represent personal goals, expectations, beliefs, emotions, standards, competencies, intentions, and strategies, derived from biological substrates and social learning.

Some of the units revolve around strategies to regulate behavior and control attention. Specifically, the capacity to inhibit intense, but undesirable, temptations or impulses depends on two key inclinations: the motivation to regulate behavior and the capacity to regulate behavior. Motivation to regulate behavior depends on the appraisal that an act is unsuitable, beliefs about the consequences of this act, as well as the desire to maintain desirable behavior. Capacity to regulate behavior, however, depends on the accessibility or salience of units that underpin this inhibition of unsuitable behavior.

Interestingly, many cues can affect the accessibility of these units and, thus, ultimately shape delay in gratification. Specifically, cues that relate to abstract, rational concepts, called cool qualities, like "Think about the marshmallow as a cloud", tend to delay gratification. Cues that relate to sensations and rewards, such as "While you wait, think about cookies", called hot qualities, curbs this delay. These findings imply the cognitive-affective units can be classified into two systems: an emotional, hot system, partly underpinned by the amygdala, and a cognitive, cool system, more related to the hippocampus (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; for a similar distinction, see Cognitive experiential self theory). As stress escalates, the hot system tends to dominate the cold system; to regulate impulses the mechanisms that attenuate the intensity of the hot system need to be activated.

The capacity to apply suitable strategies and thus delay gratification as a toddler, perhaps by distracting their attention to toys or other people, predicts this capacity later in life (see Sethi, Mischel, Aber, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 2000). To illustrate, some toddlers can distract their attention to the experimenter or other objects when their parents leave the room. This tendency predicts the capacity of individuals to delay gratification later in life. Furthermore, these strategies, later in life, are inversely related to both aggression (e.g., Rodriguez, Shoda, Mischel, & Wright, 1989) and sensitivity to rejection (Levy, Ayduk, Downey, 2001).

Nevertheless, the children who delay gratification most effectively seem to orient their attention initially to hot cues and then shift to cold cues (Peake, Hebl, & Mischel, 2002). Conceivably, this tendency enables individuals to develop the capacity to demonstrate flexibility in whether they inhibit or subject themselves to the hot system. If individual always inhibit the hot system, many of their core needs will never be fulfilled.

Neurological mechanisms that underpin temporal discounting

Research has not specifically examined the neuroanatomical features or neurophysiological processes that underpin consideration of future consequences. Nevertheless, neurological studies in the realm of temporal discounting, a concept that is strongly related to consideration of future consequences (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994), offer some intriguing insights (for a comprehensive review, see Carter, Meyer, & Huettel, 2010).

A dual component model of temporal discounting was promulgated by McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004; see also McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, Cohen, 2007). First, according to this model, mesolimbic regions like the nucleus accumbens and medial prefrontal cortex are activated when individuals choose alternatives that confer immediate rewards. The nucleus accumbens and medial prefrontal cortex represent part of the mesolimbic pathway; in this pathway, dopaminergic neurons project from the midbrain, specifically the ventral tegmental area, to regions like the amygdala, hippocampus, nucleus accumbens, and medial prefrontal cortex.

Second, lateral cortical regions, especially the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex, are activated when individuals consider choices that could confer either immediate or future rewards. McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and Cohen (2004) referred to the mesolimbic and lateral cortical regions as the beta and delta systems respectively. They argued the beta system increases the weight of immediate rewards and the delta system increases the weight of rewards at other times as well. From this perspective, limited levels of temporal discounting, and thus consideration of future consequences, might represent elevated activation of the lateral cortical regions relative to the mesolimbic regions.

Nevertheless, as Kable and Glimcher (2007) argued, temporal discounting could be underpinned by the mesolimbic region alone. Specifically, activation of this region diminishes if rewards are either delayed or limited in magnitude. They maintain this system alone represents the significance of a reward, by integrating information about both the time and magnitude, applying hyperbolic discounting.

To reconcile this conflict, Ballard and Knutson (2009) utilized fMRI to examine the activation of various regions in the aftermath of immediate or delayed rewards at various magnitudes. The findings were telling. First, as the magnitude of future rewards increased, activation of the mesolimbic regions, including the nucleus accumbens, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex, also escalated. These regions thus represent the magnitude of delayed rewards. Second, as the delay of future rewards increased, lateral cortical regions, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and temporal-parietal junction, diminished--especially in impulsive participants who discounted future rewards. Furthermore, some regions, like the medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, but not the nuclear accumbens, were sensitive to both the delay and magnitude of the rewards, particularly in impulsive participants. These findings corroborate the notion that two distinct systems might underpin temporal discounting, but also emphasize that even the mesolimbic system is sensitive to future rewards.

These results are consistent with the proposition that inhibiting immediate gratification, and instead choosing a course of action that confers a sizeable reward in the future, demands cognitive control and inhibition of dominant inclinations. This inhibition, potentially underpinning ego depletion, demands the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and also perhaps the inferior frontal gyrus--which was also contingent upon both delay and magnitude. Presumably, this inhibition is more difficult to maintain over longer durations, explaining the finding that activation of these regions decreases as the delays increase, especially in impulsive individuals.

Working memory

Elevated levels of temporal discounting, and thus limited consideration of future consequences, might sometimes represent impairments in working memory. Specifically, when working memory is impaired, individuals may not be able to maintain their attention on hypothetical, but plausible, future consequences. Consistent with this proposition, if working memory is distracted by other considerations, temporal discounting is amplified (e.g., Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; for some controversies about these principles, see Franco-Watkins, Rickard, & Pashler, 2010).

Recent studies indicate that working memory can indeed be enhanced (e.g., Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004), potentially enhancing a consideration of future consequences and curbing impulsive behavior. Olesen, Westerberg, and Klingberg (2004), for example, showed that training that is intended to enhance working memory does indeed increase neural activity in the middle frontal gyrus as well as the superior and inferior parietal cortices--regions that underpin some facets of working memory (see also Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002a).

Specifically, in the first experiment, every day, across three to four weeks, some participants completed 90 trials that demand working memory (Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004). Three distinct working memory tasks was administered. Other participants did not complete this training. Furthermore, fMRI was undertaken before and after training. Training on these activities was shown to improve performance on tasks that were not included in the training program, such as the Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices. Furthermore, after training, when participants completed tasks that demanded working memory, activity in the middle frontal gyrus as well as in the parietal cortices increased (Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004).

The second study was similar. In this study, eight healthy adults undertook 25 days of training, across five weeks. On each day, they completed 90 trials, demanding visuospatial memory, such as recalling the position of items that appeared briefly on a screen. After training, digit span performance improved. Furthermore, when participants undertook tasks that demand working memory, activity in the middle frontal gyrus as well as in the parietal cortices was augmented (Olesen, Westerberg, & Klingberg, 2004).

In short, practice on tasks that demand working memory can enhance this ability. These benefits have been observed in clinical populations as well, such as in ADHD (Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002b). Typically, training might involve tasks like reverse digit span, in which a series of numbers is presented, and individuals must transcribe these numbers in reverse order (Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002b).

Psychometric properties scales that measure consideration of future consequences

Most researchers in this literature utilize the same measure, developed and validated by Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Edwards (1994), to gauge consideration of future consequences. This measure comprises 12 items. Typical items include "I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself" (reverse coded), "My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take (reverse coded)", and "I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative outcome will not occur for many years".

Initially, this measure was assumed to comprise one factor only; recent factor analyses, however, have distinguished two distinct factors, with various interpretations (e.g., Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008; Petrocelli, 2003; Toepoel, 2010).

To illustrate, these studies indicate that one factor represents all the questions that need to be reverse scored--that is, questions in which agreement reflects consideration of immediate consequences. The second factor represents all the questions that do not need to be reverse scored--that is, questions in which agreement reflects consideration of future consequences (e.g., Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg, & Schultz, 2008; Petrocelli, 2003; Toepoel, 2010). A confirmatory factor analysis, reported by Hevey, Pertl, Thomas, Maher, Craig, and Ni Chuinneagain (2010), corroborated this general proposition as well.

Reliability

Toepoel (2010) administered the scale to the general population in Holland, every 12 months for 11 years. Alpha internal consistency ranged from 72 to .77. However, previous studies had usually generated higher values of internal consistency, ranging from .80 to .86 in the studies reported by Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Edwards (1994). Toepoel (2010) utilized a heterogenous, rather than student sample, and this difference could explain the lower estimates of internal consistency. Furthermore, for most years, one of the twelve items had been dropped by Toepoel (2010).

Stability over time

Toepoel (2010) examined the stability of this measure over an 11 year period. In particular, consideration of future consequences was included in a longitudinal survey about financial behavior, administered to the Dutch population from 1996 to 2006. In general, the correlations between one year and another year during this decade ranged from .40 to .60. In addition, ANOVAs revealed that consideration of future consequences did, in general, change across the 11 year period. However, consecutive years seldom, but sometimes, differed from one another.

Manipulations of this consideration of future consequences

In a study conducted by Wolf, Cohen, Kirchner, Rea, Montoya, and Insko (2009), consideration of future consequences was manipulated experimentally. That is, some of the participants were instructed to consider the future actions of partners in a prisoner's dilemma. This prompt was shown to increase cooperation.

Related measures

Future time perspective

Future time perspective was delineated Zimbardo and Boyd (1999). This scale represents the degree to which individuals ponder future events. Nevertheless, unlike consideration of future consequences, this scale does not represent the extent to which individuals attach importance to these future consequences as they arrive at their decisions. A future time perspective is inversely associated with risky driving behavior (Zimbardo, Keough, & Boyd, 1997).

Impulsiveness: UPPS model

Some individuals are often impulsive: They act without deliberation; they cannot resist temptations; they often engage in thrilling activities, and so forth. Impulsiveness is also related to consideration of future consequences and temporal discounting. Indeed, according to Kirby and Finch (2010), temporal discounting, or the tendency to dismiss the value of future rewards, underpins many impulsive behaviors, such as substance abuse.

The UPPS model differentiates four facets of impulsivity (Cyders & Smith, 2007): urgency, premeditation, perseverance, and sensation seeking. Urgency represents strong automatic reactions, often in response to powerful emotions. Premeditation describes the extent to which individuals consider the consequence of some act. Perseverance represents the extent to which individuals maintain effort on a task that is monotonous or challenging. Sensation seeking refers to tendency to seek enjoyable and exciting activities.

Several studies have examined whether two distinct forms of inhibition--prepotent response or motor inhibition and resistance to proactive interference or cognition inhibition--corresponds to impulsivity. Prepotent response or motor inhibition reflects the capacity to suppress a dominant and automatic response. This capacity is associated with the capacity to resist interference from extraneous information. To measure this capacity, participants might complete a go-no go task in which they must withhold responses to targets that appear on approximately 10% of occasions.

Performance on this task is inversely related to urgency (Gay, Rochat, Billieuz, d'Acremont, & Van der Linden, 2008). Accordingly, urgency might partly represent the inability to override dominant responses.

Resistance to proactive interference or cognition inhibition represents the inability of some individuals to disregard information that was previously relevant. The recent-negatives task can be used to evaluate this ability. On each trial a series of four lowercase letters appear, such as bflt. Then, an uppercase letter appears. Participants must determine whether the uppercase letter is equivalent to one of the lowercase letters. Some of the uppercase letters that do not match the lowercase letters do match the previous set of lowercase letters. Impaired performance on these trials indicates that individuals could not readily disregard information that was previously relevant or familiar. This form of inhibition is also regarded as unintentional: Participants are not aware they must suppress this information.

Limited perseveration is related to impaired performance on these trials (Gay, Rochat, Billieuz, d'Acremont, & Van der Linden, 2008). Hence, if individuals cannot neglect information that is no longer relevant--that is, familiar cues--perseveration on current tasks can diminish. A task that demands more intentional disregard of past information, however, does not correlate with perseveration (Phillippe, Courvoisier, Billieux, Rochat, Schmidt, & Van der Linden, 2010).

Impulsivity is also related to the excessive use of mobile phones. In a study conducted by Billieux, Van der Linden, d'Acremont, Ceschi, and Zermatten (2007), undergraduate students completed a measure of impulsive behavior, comprising these four distinct facets: urgency, limited premeditation, limited perseverance, and sensation seeking. In addition, they completed questions that assess their use of mobile telephones as well as the extent to which they feel dependent on these phones.

Urgency, in which individuals feel strong impulses to act in response to negative events, was positively related to dependence on mobile phones. Urgency might represent the inability to suppress dominant responses and, thus, curbs the capacity of individuals to override their impulse to use their phone. Similarly, limited perseverance, representing in inability to remain focused on a tedious or challenging task, was also related to this dependence. This inability might reflect undue distractibility to other opportunities, such as phoning friends.

Impulsiveness: Other taxonomies

Many instruments can be utilized to measure impulsiveness (for a review, see Kirby & Finch, 2010). These instruments include the Barratt Impulsiveness Scales, the EASI Temperament survey, the Guilford-Zimmerman Temperament Survey Restraint and General Activity Scales, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire, the Personality Research Form Impulsivity Scale, the Sensation Seeking Scale, and the 16 PF.

Kirby and Finch (2010) subjected these scales, after removing redundant items, into factor analyses. Horns parallel analysis and Velicer's minimum average partial correlation test were undertaken to uncover the number of factors. Approximately, seven to eight distinct facets of impulsiveness emerged. These factors included preparation and care (e.g., "I plan tasks carefully"), impetuous (e.g., "I do things without thinking"), divertible (e.g., "I buy things I don't need"), thrill and risk seeking (e.g., "Would you enjoy skydiving"), happy go-lucky (e.g., "I am a carefree individual"), impatiently pleasure seeking (e.g., "I easily become impatient with people)--a factor that was highly related to temporal discounting--and reserved (e.g., "I like parties I attend to be lively").

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Created by Dr Simon Moss on 09/06/2010

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