Spreading of alternatives

Overview

Individuals often need to choose among several options. They might, for example, need to decide which of several job applicants to recruit, houses to purchase, or holiday destinations to visit. Often, in these instances, each of the alternatives demonstrate both benefits and drawbacks-and hence the decisions are difficult to reach. If recruiting employees, for example, they might perceive Tom as more intelligent, experienced, and creative, but perceive Harry as more sociable, composed, and empathic.

Interestingly, after individuals reach a decision, they become more aware of the benefits and merits of the alternative they selected. If they choose Tom, for example, the intelligence, experience, and creativity of this person is more salient. Likewise, they become more aware of the drawbacks or complications of the options they rejected. In this example, the positive qualities of Harry are obscured and his negative qualities are magnified. The selected alternative seems unambiguously superior overall-an inclination called the spreading of alternatives (for a review, see Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008).

Spreading of alternatives is patently adaptive. If individuals did not exhibit this tendency, they would continue to perceive all the alternatives as similar in utility or value. Any minor perturbations in the environment, such as additional information, could change the relative standing of these alternatives. Individuals who initially chose Tom might, hours later, decide that Harry is superior. Regret would be rife; choices would often be revoked; decisions would often not be implemented; efficiency would decline expeditiously.

Factors that magnify the spreading of alternatives

Several studies indicate that spreading of alternatives depends on the mindset of individuals (see Mind set theory). That is, sometimes individuals strive to assess alternatives and select options, called a deliberative phase. On other occasions, individuals attempt to develop plans and means to initiate these selections, called an implemental or action phase (see Gollwitzer, 1990). According to Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002), spreading of alternatives should diminish when individuals assess alternatives; biases towards the preferred option might generate unsuitable choices. In contrast, spreading of alternatives should be pronounced during the implemental phase--in which initiation of action is the principal motive.

Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones (2002) conducted studies that substantiate these arguments. In one study, for example, some participants were instructed to list seven activities they could undertake to enhance their performance on some physical exercise they had selected. These reflections have been shown to evoke the implemental phase (e.g., Henderson, de Liver, & Gollwitzer, 2008). Other participants were instructed to list seven activities they undertake in a typical day, which does not necessary activate any specific mindset.

Next, participants evaluated various alternatives before and after some decision. If the implemental phase was evoked, participants were especially inclined to evaluate the alternative they chose favorably after they chose this option, which reflects a spreading of alternatives. In other words, spreading of alternatives was more pronounced if participants had previous imagined initiating various activities.

Mechanisms that underpin the spreading of alternatives

Originally, spreading of alternatives was regarded as a means to curb cognitive dissonance-- to circumvent conflicts between preferences and behaviors (e.g., Brehm, 1956). That is, if individuals do not engage in spreading of alternatives, their behavior to choose one alternative conflicts with the positive attitudes towards the other options. This conflict evokes an aversive state, called cognitive dissonance (see Cognitive dissonance).

Alternative accounts have been proposed. Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (2007), for example, argue that spreading of alternatives is akin to an endowment effect, which they call associative self-anchoring. In particular, when individuals choose one alternative, they associate this option with the self. As a consequence, whether or not they subsequently prefer the chosen alternative--and thus demonstrate spreading of alternatives--will depend on their implicit attitudes or evaluations of themselves.

Generally, individuals form positive associations with the self; hence, they will usually prefer the chosen alternative. Nevertheless, some individuals form negative associations with the self; these individuals will not necessarily prefer the chosen alternative. They will not, therefore, invariably demonstrate spreading of alternatives.

The implications of this model, which was substantiated by Gawronski, Bodenhausen, and Becker (2007), are vital. If individuals do not perceive themselves favorably, they will seldom show spreading of alternatives. As a consequence, they will often regret their choices and fail to initiate their decisions. Their perceptions towards themselves might, thus, decline further. A vicious cycle might evolve.

Neural basis to the spreading of alternatives

Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, and Johnson (2008) examined the neural underpinnings to this spreading of alternatives. They showed that activation of left frontal regions amplified this spreading of alternatives.

In particular. to activate this region, Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, and Johnson (2008) utilized EEG biofeedback training, also called neurofeedback training. In this paradigm, participants receive information about their brainwave activity, through video display, vibration, or sound. They receive rewards whenever the activation of the desired region--the region the experimenters want to assess--is augmented. When this procedure was applied to activate left rather than right frontal regions, spreading of alternatives was magnified.

Interesting, in a subsequent study, when an implemental phase was evoked, a similar pattern of brain activation was observed (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008). According to Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, and Johnson (2008), the left rather than right frontal regions seem to be involved with initiating actions to approach desirable end states--especially when conflicting inclinations are activated; spreading of alternatives seem to have evolved to resolve these conflicts and to initiate action.

Research undertaken by MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, and Carter (2000) underscores the role of left frontal regions in the resolution of conflicting inclinations. The left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, for example, seems to more active when individuals need to undertake actions that diverge from their natural inclinations. In particular, this region is more active before individuals need to name the colors, rather than read the words, in Stroop tasks.

References

Brehm, J. W. (1956). Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 384-389.

Gawronski, B., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Becker, A. P. (2007). I like it, because I like myself: Associative self-anchoring and post-decisional change of implicit evaluations. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 221-232.

Gollwitzer, P. M. (1990). Action phases and mind-sets. In E. T. Higgins & R. M. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 53-92). New York: Guilford Press.

Gollwitzer, P. M., & Bayer, U. (1999). Deliberative versus implemental mindsets in the control of action. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 403-422). New York: Guilford Press.

Harmon-Jones, E. (1999). Toward an understanding of the motivation underlying dissonance effects: Is the production of aversive consequences necessary to cause dissonance? In E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills (Eds.), Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology (pp. 71-99). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Harmon-Jones, E., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2002). Testing the action-based model of cognitive dissonance: The effect of action orientation on postdecisional attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 711-723.

Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., Fearn, M., Sigelman, J., & Johnson, P. (2008). Left frontal cortical activation and spreading of alternatives: Tests of the action-based model of dissonance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 1-15.

Henderson, M., D., de Liver, Y., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2008). The effects of an implemental mind-set on attitude strength. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 396-411.

MacDonald, A. W., III, Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., & Carter, C. S. (2000, June 9). Dissociating the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex in cognitive control. Science, 288, 1835-1838.

Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 213-226.

Created by Dr Simon Moss on 07/05/2009

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