Implicit theories of malleability

Overview

Some individuals assume the fundamental character, morality, and competence of humans tends to be fixed, not malleable, called an entity theory. Other individuals, in contrast, assume the core character, morality, or competence of humans is not fixed, but can evolve over time, called an incremental theory. Several practices can be applied to cultivate the belief that humans are malleable--an assumption that affords many benefits, such as the capacity to withstand change and criticism (Werth, Markel, & Forster, 2006).

Consequences of implicit malleability

Overview of benefits and limitations

Individuals who assume the character or competence of humans is malleable cope more effectively with change, embracing rather than rejecting initiatives and developments (Werth, Markel, & Forster, 2006). They also consider and adopt, rather than disregard or deride, the advice and feedback they receive (Maurer, Mitchell, & Barbeite, 2002). Likewise, they are less inclined to disregard information that contradicts their beliefs or stereotypes (Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001). Indeed, they are more receptive to diversity, tending to respect individuals from other ethnicities, occupations, or departments (Hong et al, 2004).

They also are less inclined to feel like a phony, feeling they deserve the praise and recognition they receive (Kumar & Jagacinski, 2006). Finally, they also set challenging goals as well as perform more effectively than peers on complex, difficult tasks.

Nevertheless, individuals who assume the character or competence of humans is malleable are occasionally perceived as erratic rather than clear (Werth, Markel, & Forster, 2006).

Reactions to feedback

Many researchers assume that, in general, individuals who espouse an incremental theory--and thus feel they can change fundamentally--are more receptive to feedback (Maurer, Mitchell, & Barbeite, 2002). They are, for example, less defensive.

For example, as shown by Nussbaum and Dweck (2008), if individuals feel that intelligence or ability is fixed--and cannot be developed over time--they are more likely to act defensively if they receive criticisms or adverse feedback. Rather than strive to improve their performance, they will deny the criticism, compare themselves to someone who is even less proficient, or display symbols, such as certificates, which demonstrate their competence. That is, because they do not feel they can improve, they must act defensively to maintain their self esteem. In contrast, if individuals feel that intelligence or ability can be cultivated through effort and training, they are less inclined to act defensively. Instead, they engage in practice and other strategies to improve their performance. They will, for example, become more likely to seek advice from experts.

Nevertheless, in some instances, individuals who adopt an incremental theory feel more anxious in response to feedback (Plaks & Stecher, 2007). Specifically, individuals who espouse this incremental theory assume they can change fundamentally. If these individuals had received assistance on some task, they would expect to improve. If informed their performance has not changed, this expectation is violated, and anxiety ensues (Plaks & Stecher, 2007).

In contrast, individuals who espouse an entity theory presuppose they cannot change fundamentally. If these individuals had received assistance on some task, they would not necessarily expect to improve. If informed their performance has not changed, this expectation is fulfilled, and anxiety dissipates (Plaks & Stecher, 2007). Indeed, if informed they had improved considerably, the positive feelings this information evokes coincides with a sense of anxiety as well--an anxiety that emanates from the violation of their expectations.

Effort

Relative to employees who feel that competence and character can vary, employees feel the competence and character of individuals is fixed sometimes demonstrate more effort and dedication after failures, at least if when they undertake tasks they feel assess their ability (El-Alayli, 2006). Specifically, individuals who adopt an entity theory strive to establish, rather than enhance, their level of competence. Accordingly, they tend to direct their attention towards opportunities that assess their competence or ability; they will thus devote more effort to tasks that assess their capacities.

In contrast, individuals who adopt an incremental theory strive to enhance, rather than establish, their level of competence. Hence, they tend to direct their attention towards opportunities that could improve their capacities. They do not devote effort to tasks that merely assess their skills. Instead, they demonstrate effort only when the activities could enhance their competence. This congruency model was indeed verified empirically by El-Alayli (2006).

Practice

Individuals who feel that competence is fixed, and cannot be developed through effort and training, are more likely to worry before they engage in a task that might reflect their intelligence or ability. They are also less likely to practice and, hence, their performance tends to be relatively inferior (Cury, Da Fonseca, Zahn, & Elliot, 2008).

Specifically, these individuals feel that inferior performance is a fundamental reflection of their competence--and their character. They begin to worry and indeed refrain from practice, to ensure they can ascribe failures to limited familiarity with the task rather than limited ability. In contrast, individuals who feel that competence is malleable, and can be developed through practice, do not feel that inferior performance is a fundamental reflection of their competence. They are less concerned about the prospect of failure, which curbs worrying, ultimately increasing the likelihood they will practice the task and improve their ability.

Learning

The relationship between implicit theories of malleability and learning may depend on the regulatory focus of individuals (Higgins, 1997; see regulatory focus theory). In one study, conducted by Sue-Chan and Wood (2009), participants completed training in a technique that facilitates problem solving. If participants adopted an entity theory, their subsequent performance was more proficient if they had espoused a promotion rather than prevention focus--that is, if they had oriented their attention towards expediting progress rather than fulfilling duties. In particular, these participants were inclined to apply the technique they learned one month later. In contrast, if participants adopted an incremental theory, regulatory focus did not appreciably affect performance.

When individuals demonstrate a prevention focus, their principal motivation is to circumvent more immediate shortfalls or deficiencies. If they also adopt an entity theory, they might doubt whether the training could improve their performance. Any errors, thus, are both salient as well as distressing, which can damage learning.

Punishment

If individuals adopt an entity theory, and thus believe that people cannot change fundamentally, they value punishment and retribution in response to unsuitable behavior. If individuals adopt an incremental theory, and thus believe that people can change fundamentally, they favor rehabilitation instead.

To illustrate, in a study conducted by Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu (1997), undergraduate students, participating in a study, were told about a professor who unjustly modified a system of grading, without justifying this amendment to students. Relative to other participants, students who espoused an entity theory believed this person should be punished.

Similarly, in another study conducted by Gervey, Chiu, Hong, and Dweck (1999), participants read about a person who was imprisoned after committing a murder. The participants were asked to discuss the functions of imprisonment. Individuals who adopted an entity theory referred to punishment and retribution; individuals who adopted an incremental theory referred to rehabilitation or education.

Cooperation and support

Implicit theories are likely to affect the extent to which individuals engage in community or cooperative behavior. Individuals who adopt an entity theory often believe the life conditions of people are fixed; these individuals thus might feel less inclined to engage in community behavior, intended to redress any deprivation (Karafantis & Levy, 2004). In contrast, individuals who adopt an incremental theory believe the life conditions of people can change. They will, thus, feel more inspired to support some cause or community (Karafantis & Levy, 2004).

Karafantis and Levy (2004) generated some results that support this proposition. In one study, children between the age of 9 and 12 were asked to report their attitudes towards homeless children. In addition, they specified the extent to which they have already volunteered to help deprived communities in the past. Relative to children who espoused an entity theory, children who espoused an incremental theory were more likely to express positive attitudes to homeless children: They perceived social contact with these children as a positive opportunity, for example. They also had volunteered more frequently in the past.

Individuals who adopt an entity, rather than incremental, theory are also not as willing to coach other people. In one study, conducted by Heslin, Vandewalle, and Latham (2006), managers completed a measure of their implicit theories. Six weeks later, they received feedback about their coaching behavior from their employees. If managers exhibited an entity rather than incremental theory, they did not offer significant coaching, as rated by their employees.

In a subsequent study, Heslin, Vandewalle, and Latham (2006) manipulated the extent to which individuals are likely to adopt an entity theory. All the participants initially espoused an entity theory. Some of these participants, however, were exposed to a workshop that highlighted how people can change. Finally, all participants watched videotapes of employees, attempting to negotiate some outcome. They were then granted an opportunity to offer advice and coaching to these employees. If participants had been exposed to the workshop that emphasizes how people can change, purportedly inciting an incremental theory, they were more willing to provide coaching.

Trust and forgiveness

Often, individuals feel that a friend or relative has violated their trust and acted inappropriately. They become disinclined to trust this person in the future. Nevertheless, if this person apologizes and maintains they will behave appropriately in the future, individuals might be able to reinstate this trust.

As Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, and Wood (2010) showed, the assumption that morality is malleable rather than immutable facilitates this capacity to restore trust. Specifically, in this study, participants read one of two essays: One of the essays implied that morality is malleable and the other essay implied that morality is immutable (see Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007, for a similar manipulation).

Next, they engaged in a game with another person, intended to assess their capacity to restore a sense of trust after an apology. In particular, in this game, they were granted 6$ and could either retain this money or distribute this money to the other person. The money, if distributed to the other person, was tripled. The other person could either retain the ensuing $18 or return half. For each of these trials, the two individuals reached this decision simultaneously and communicated over computer. During the first three trials, the other person, actually a confederate, did not return the money. Then, the other person apologized. Whether participants later chose to distribute the money reflected a measure of trust recovery.

As hypothesized, when participants were prompted to assume that morality is malleable, they were more likely to trust the other person in response to the recovery. Presumably, if morality is assumed to be malleable, individuals feel the apology might be sincere and the person might have changed.

Antecedents of implicit malleability

Exemplars

Individuals cannot, at least immediately, convince themselves that human character and competence is malleable if they actually perceive these qualities as fixed. They can, however, engage in a few exercises that foster this assumption. First, they should reflect upon which of their friends or colleagues have changed the most over time, perhaps improving their social skills or escalating their discipline. They should transcribe the name of this person, perhaps in a diary, revisting this name whenever they feel anxious or frustrated. This exercise has been shown to instil the belief that humans are malleable (Poon & Koehler, 2006).

Skill development

In addition, individuals should attempt to cultivate their knowledge on some topic or develop a specific skill--perhaps enrolling in a program or reading a book on bookkeeping, for example. Knowledge and skill development implies that competence is not fixed (Hong et al, 2004).

To illustrate, Heslin, Latham, and VandeWalle (2005) developed a procedure that primes an entity or incremental theory. Specifically, some participants were asked to recall a past event that evoked change in their character. This instruction, coupled with an essay that reinforces the possibility of such change, fostered an incremental theory.

Proverbs

Supervisors or managers should, at least occasionally, recount proverbs that highlight the capacity of individuals to change. Conveying phrases such as "It-'s never too late to learn" and "Experience is the best teacher" have been shown to promote the assumption that humans are quintessentially malleable.

Furthermore, supervisors or managers should communicate the recent discovery that even the personality of individuals, such as the extent to which they are extraverted, sociable, and composed, can change significantly over time. In particular, individuals become increasingly sociable, talkative, energetic, adventurous, and assertive if they enjoy their job (Scollon & Diener, 2006).

To illustrate, in a study by Aronson et al. (2002) , some participants were informed that intelligence can be cultivated or developed "like a muscle". This information, which is assumed to prime existing implicit theories, improved academic performance.

Any activities that underscore the traits of individuals, such as workshops in which employees are assigned labels, putatively reflecting their personality or style, often inculcate the belief that humans are fixed. Coordinators of these activities, therefore, must emphasize that such labels are transient, not permanent.

Correlates of implicit malleability

Goal orientation

According to Dweck and Elliott (1983), individuals who adopt an entity theory of malleability tend to pursue performance goals (see goal orientation): That is, they prefer to demonstrate, rather than develop, their expertise. These individuals conceptualize achievement contexts, such as exams, as tests of some inherent competence rather than progress. Therefore, they want to outperform other people or exceed some benchmark. In contrast, individuals who adopt an incremental theory tend to pursue learning goals: They strive to enhance and refine their skills and competence. These individuals conceptualize achievement contexts as opportunities to develop.

Robins and Pals (2002) conducted research that verifies these arguments. In their study, implicit theories, goal orientation, and attribution style were assessed. Path analyses revealed that entity theorists were more likely to adopt performance goals, whereas incremental theorists were more likely to adopt learning goals. When performance goals were adopted, participants attributed outcomes to uncontrollable causes, like the ability of colleagues or the difficulty and complexity of the tasks. When learning goals were adopted, participants attributed outcomes to controllable causes, such as effort and strategies.

Categories of implicit theories

Rather than explore perceived malleability of global character or competence, some studies examine the perceived malleability of specific characteristics. Indeed, researchers have explored the perceived malleability of intelligence (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999), stereotyping (e.g., Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998), and romantic relationships (e.g., Knee, 1998; Knee, Patrick, & Lonsbary, 2003), for example.

Negotiation ability

Kray and Haselhuhn (2007), for example, examined the implicit theories towards the malleability of negotiation ability. Individuals who feel the capacity to negotiate effectively can be developed, and is not fixed, tend to perform more effectively in negotiations--especially when impediments arise or when they recognize their abilities in this endeavour are limited.

Measures of implicit theories

Scales with three items

Dweck, Chui, and Hong (1995a) developed a series of short scales or measures that are often utilized or adapted to gauge whether or not individuals adopt an entity theory. The scales can represent perceived malleability either in specific domains or across broad spheres of life.

To illustrate, one of the measures assesses implicit theories of malleability in the domain of intelligence. One of the three items, for example, is "Your intelligence is something about you that you can't change very much". Similarly, another measure assessed the perceived malleability of moral character, epitomized by items like "Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their personality. It cannot be changed very much". In contrast, another measure assessed perceived malleability of people in general. One of the three items is "People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed". Likewise, one measure assessed perceived malleability of the world: An example is "Our world has its basic or ingrained dispositions, and you really can't do much to change them" (see Dweck, Chui, & Hong, 1995a).

In each of these subscales, agreement with the items reflect an entity theory and disagreement with the items reflect an incremental theory. Dweck, Chui, and Hong (1995a) argued that an entity and incremental theory represent two poles of one dimension and, thus, do not need to be measured separately. Furthermore, an incremental theory is often regarded as more socially desirable; thus, excluding questions that refer to this theory might diminish a bias towards socially desirable responses.

Dweck, Chui, and Hong (1995a) also showed that implicit theories towards people were highly related to implicit theories towards intelligence and morality. In contrast, implicit theories towards people were not as highly related to implicit theories towards the world. These findings attest to the validity of these measures. These findings, together with other patterns of correlations, indicate that an acquiescence bias is unlikely to underpin agreement towards items that reflect an entity theory (Heyman & Dweck, 1998).

Other measures

Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck (1998) developed a measure that comprises eight items. For some of the items, agreement reflects an entity theory; for other items, agreement reflects an incremental theory. Items include "People can change even their most basic qualities" and "Everyone, no matter who they are, can significantly change their basic characteristic". Alpha reliability tends to exceed .90 (Heslin, Latham, & VandeWalle, 2005).

Controversies

In some studies, individuals receive information that violates their extant theory. They might be informed they had not improved after practice, which violates an incremental theory, ultimately evoking anxiety in individuasl who would otherwise espouse this implicit belief (Plaks et al., 2001).

Superficially, this manipulation seems to resemble procedures that are intended to manipulate these implicit theories. In these studies, for example, individuals receive explicit information that vindicates either an incremental or entity theory. To prime an incremental theory, for example, they might be informed that intelligence can be cultivated (e.g., Aronson et al., 2002).

Plaks et al. (2001) distinguish between these two manipulations. When theories are violated, no alternative belief is offered. In contrast, when theories are primed, an alternative is offered.

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Created by Dr Simon Moss on 18/10/2008

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